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accepted view that the Exchequer derived its name from the chequered cloth that covered the table on which the accounts were audited. This view does not however receive support from a statement of William Fitz Stephen, quoted in *The Commune of London* (p. 63), that in 1164 John the Marshal was "officially engaged at the quadrangular table, which from its counters (*calculis*) of two colors, is commonly called the Exchequer (*scaccarium*).” The counters evidently resembled *scacci*, or chess-men. Now if Fitz Stephen "knew his London well," as Mr. Round assures us that he did, why not accept his explanation of the name *scaccarium*? Fitz Neal, in his *Dialogue of the Exchequer*, gives a detailed account of the table and explains the origin of the term *scaccarium*; he speaks of a "pannus niger virgis distinctus," but says nothing concerning a chequered cloth. On page 201 Mr. Round informs us, on the authority of Dr. Stubbs, that the writer formerly described as "Benedictus Abbas" is "now virtually known to have been Richard Fitz Nigel;" and yet Dr. Stubbs presented his view merely as "a chance hypothesis," and—convinced of his mistake by Dr. Liebermann's arguments—now admits that "as a mere conjecture it is not worth defending." On page 237 we are told that "Dr. Gross . . . appears to consider these officers (the *échevins*) a purely Continental institution;" but the *Gild Merchant*, I. 26, to which Mr. Round refers in a footnote, calls particular attention to the existence of *échevins* in the guilds of many English boroughs. The fact that the charter of Henry, duke of the Normans, confirmed to the citizens of Rouen (1150–1151) their port at Dowgate, as they held it from the days of Edward the Confessor, is scarcely "unknown to English historians" (p. 246), for it is set forth in a book published by the Clarendon Press several years ago.

These errors, though most of them are of little importance, show that "absolute exactitude in statement," the lack of which among his contemporaries Mr. Round so often deplors, is difficult of attainment even by the most careful historians.

CHARLES GROSS.

Histoire de la Marine Française. I. Les Origines. Par CHARLES DE LA RONCIÈRE, Ancien Membre de l'École Française de Rome. (Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit et Cie. 1899. Pp. 532.)

M. DE LA RONCIÈRE'S *Histoire de la Marine Française* belongs to the class of naval history of which Sir Harris Nicolas's admirable work is the typical example. For his opening volume, *Les Origines*, which carries us from Gallo-Roman times down to the opening year of the Hundred Years' War, M. de la Roncière could not have chosen a better model. Indeed a pleasant note that runs through the whole volume is the French scholar's frank appreciation of his English forerunner. It is equally pleasant to say that not only does M. de la Roncière surpass his model in the literary skill of his narrative passages, but also that wherever he is concerned with the elucidation of obscure points of medieval maritime

history—and those which he clears up are too numerous even to mention—his work deserves a place at least as high as that which Nicolas has long held. Where he leaves the field in which he proves himself so sound a master the result is not always so admirable. At the outset the work is unfortunately marred by an unphilosophical division of the subject. It is difficult to believe that an arbitrary chronological classification will help his task. Even if he succeeds in showing any generic difference between the naval art of the later Middle Ages and that of the early Renaissance it is certainly impossible for him to draw any distinct line between the later Renaissance and Richelieu. Scientifically the arrangement rests on no real basis. Fra Guglielmotti in his *Storia della Marina Pontificia*, a work which M. de la Roncière does not quote, has pointed out that the only sound division must be on the bases of oars, sails and steam. Even from the narrower point of view of French naval history there seems no greater reason for opening a period with the revival of Richelieu than with the revival of Philippe le Bel. It was the Protestant privateers of the sixteenth century who really opened the modern period.

In searching for his foundations M. de la Roncière digs somewhat deep and wide. He tells us at length of the two Roman naval organizations established at Marseilles and Boulogne, and a good deal of the action of their fleets, which seems hardly to fall within his province, as having had little or no influence on the true French navy. One would gladly have sacrificed the whole of the classical prelude for a clear summary of the naval lore of Vegetius, to whose deep influence on the mediæval French navy he only refers incidentally. The same too might be said of the next section devoted to the navy of Charlemagne. Still M. de la Roncière has a good defence in the peculiar difficulty of his special subject. From the fact that France had two distinct coasts, as wide apart from a naval point of view as England and Venice, French naval history is necessarily highly complex. It is fed both from the Mediterranean and from the Atlantic, and so far do the two streams flow on side by side without thoroughly mingling that the duty of following up each branch seems hardly avoidable. The complexity does not even end here. For each stream is itself composite. That of the Mediterranean is composed of Eastern and Western influences and that of the Atlantic springs on the one hand from the North Sea and Baltic and on the other from the Bay of Biscay and Portugal. If M. de la Roncière does not completely fill in his design with a consideration of the African and Iberian sources he amply makes up for the defect by his masterly gathering of the threads. In the mixed Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western nomenclature in use in the *Clos des Galées* at Rouen he spreads before us the strangely woven web, and with a sure and original hand traces it back to the Norman sea kingdom of the two Sicilies. Around the word "admiral" he weaves a whole fabric of highly illuminating historical etymology. His tracing of the actual origin to the title of the naval governor of Sicily is new and convincing and leaves us in no doubt that Naples was the focus

from which modern naval nomenclature and indeed modern naval art spread out again into the corners of the South. The differentiation of course increased widely in proportion to the distance from the centre, but had M. de la Roncière happened to meet with the official vocabulary of the Anglo-Egyptian coast-guard service he would have seen the old Neapolitan medley still alive and indeed still in active growth. Basque, Iberian, Italian, Arab, Breton and Teuton, all are there in eloquent confusion to this day.

At considerable length M. de la Roncière carries us on through the Crusades, but only to show us that France had no navy. The same may be said of the War of Aragon, an excellent chapter full of interest for the general history of the naval art, though for France it tells how her first attempt to create a navy was crushed in the bud. Indeed the whole moral of these early times is the instability of naval power that has not a large commercial marine behind it. It is even true of the new era that begins from the foundation of the *Clos des Galées* at Rouen. It is from this point that M. de la Roncière would date the commencement of the French navy. But all he can tell makes it plain that it was no true French navy at all, but an exotic transplanted from Genoa, doomed to wither and fail in an uncongenial and sterile soil. The most valuable part of these early chapters is the light they throw on the tactics, shipping and seafaring life of the time, though it could be wished M. de la Roncière had devoted more attention to the essential characteristics of the various types in use. He is sometimes inclined to rely on what previous workers in the field have done. We hear of numbers of different kinds of vessels and have no help given us to conceive them except where his learning has given him reason to differ from the conclusions of other naval archaeologists. The result is a certain incompleteness, marring the impression of finality to which so important and laborious a work is entitled. Even the distinction as to whether certain vessels were oared or not is passed over with no clear insistence, though it is on this distinction that the whole history of naval tactics and strategy turns. We hear of sailing ships being used merely as transports and again we see them as at Sluys taking the leading part in an action, but for M. de la Roncière the point seems to have no importance. Again we hear continually of galleys, but are never warned of the wide difference between what was called a galley in the North Sea and Baltic, and the true galley of the Genoese mercenary and the Clos de Rouen.

One point in M. de la Roncière's arrangement deserves hearty recognition. The clumsy method of dividing a naval history into "Civil" and "Military" sections, which in England has obtained an unhappy orthodoxy, he boldly discards. Such an arrangement is no doubt easy—it removes great difficulties in the construction of the narrative—but it is slipshod, inartistic and unsound. The civil and the military history are essentially interdependent. Changes of administration are almost always either the result or the cause of new phenomena of action. They cannot be parted and M. de la Roncière is to be congratulated on the success

with which he has grappled the extremely difficult task of keeping them flowing together in one broad stream.

As M. de la Roncière gathers up his threads the work proceeds with a firmer grip and concludes with abundant promise for the excellence of succeeding volumes. Naval students no less than the general historian will acknowledge an especial debt to him for his treatment of French naval action at the opening of the Hundred Years' War, and particularly for his recovery of the attempts to relieve Calais by sea. His account of the Continental system with which Philippe le Bel forestalled Napoleon is an equally valuable contribution, besides a number of other points which are wholly new and wholly admirable. With his conclusions many will of course disagree. Like most Frenchmen he is an adherent of the *guerre de course* as opposed to the *guerre d'escadre*. At the outset of her career as a naval power France, he argues, was uniformly successful with the former, while the latter almost always brought disaster. But he gives no instance where the success of the cruising squadrons materially influenced the course of a war, and many where the victory of the main fleet entirely changed it, and rendered the cruisers practically impotent. On the whole, however, he suffers his national instincts to interfere but little with his historical judgment. Only once or twice is the scholarly effect marred by rhetorical exaggeration—as for instance where he says, “au moindre signe de lui [Philippe le Bel] huit cents vaisseaux de guerre jetteront cent vingt mille hommes dans l'île [England].” Does he seriously mean that at this time France had eight hundred vessels of war capable of transporting each one hundred and fifty men besides crews, horses, and stores? Another instance of a similar looseness is where, on page 14, he mistakes Selden's doctrine of the *Mare Clausum* and cites a French admiral's action off Cape St. Vincent as a refutation of it, although Cape St. Vincent is not in the Narrow Seas. Such blemishes however are few and do little to detract from the value of M. de la Roncière's work—a work which, it is not too much to say, amounts to a resurrection of French naval history, long dead and neglected. A series of excellent reproductions of contemporary shipping pieces forms a distinct addition to the value of a volume which should bring the author the gratitude of foreign students in a scarcely less degree than that of his own countrymen.

JULIAN S. CORBETT.

La Désolation des Églises, Monastères, et Hôpitaux en France pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans. Par le P. HENRI DENIFLE, des Frères Prêcheurs, Correspondant de l'Institut. Tome I.: Documents relatifs au XV^e Siècle. Tome II.: La Guerre de Cent Ans jusqu' à la Mort de Charles V. (Paris: Picard. 1897, 1899. Pp. xxv, 608, xiv, 864.)

THE idea of undertaking this remarkable contribution to the history of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries came to its author in the course of